Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Manipulations and repeated games in future markets

Chichilnisky, Graciela (1984): Manipulations and repeated games in future markets. Published in: The Industrial Organization of Futures Markets (1984): pp. 193-214.


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This chapter analyzes the possibility of manipulation in futures markets, concentrating on the effects that manipulation may have on their informational efficiency . We use the concept of manipulation as it arises in the study of noncooperative games with imperfect information .

The problem can be summarized as follows : disclosure that is, (less anonymity) may prevent manipulation and therefore improve the informational efficiency of the market . On the other hand, disclosure (less anonymity) may restrict entry, and therefore produce an efficiency loss. There is, in this sense, a tradeoff between informational efficiency and free entry.

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