Djumashev, Ratbek and Abdullaev, Bekzod (2017): Crime, Transition, and Growth.
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Abstract
This paper analyses whether the effect of crime on growth depends on the structural changes caused by transition. The result of the simple model suggests that when the structure of economy changes, the cost of economically motivated crime will also change; thus, affecting the impact of crime on economic performance. Using data for some of the republics of the former Soviet Union, we find support for this conjecture.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Crime, Transition, and Growth |
English Title: | Crime, Transition, and Growth |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | growth, crime, transition economies |
Subjects: | O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors ; Shadow Economy ; Institutional Arrangements O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies > O57 - Comparative Studies of Countries P - Economic Systems > P2 - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies > P26 - Political Economy ; Property Rights P - Economic Systems > P5 - Comparative Economic Systems > P52 - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies |
Item ID: | 80842 |
Depositing User: | Dr Bekzod Abdullaev |
Date Deposited: | 19 Aug 2017 14:06 |
Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2019 02:42 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/80842 |