English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem

Dubra, Juan and Echenique, Federico and Manelli, Alejandro (2007): English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.

Abstract

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: English auctions, Stolper-Samuelson, single crossing
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F11 - Neoclassical Models of Trade; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C60 - General

References

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