The Effects of Secondary Markets for Government Bonds on Inflation Dynamics

Dominguez, Begona and Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro (2016): The Effects of Secondary Markets for Government Bonds on Inflation Dynamics.

Abstract

We analyze how trading in secondary markets for public debt change the inherent links between monetary and fiscal policy, by studying both inflation and debt dynamics. When agents do not trade in these markets, there exists a unique steady state and traditional passive/active policy prescriptions are useful in delivering determinate equilibria. In contrast, when agents trade in secondary markets and bonds are scarce, there exist a liquidity premium on public debt and bonds affect inflation dynamics and vice versa. Then, in a monetary equilibrium, the government budget constraint can be satisfied for different combinations of inflation and debt. Thus, self-fulfilling beliefs that deliver multiple steady states are possible. Moreover, traditional passive/active policy prescriptions are not always useful in delivering determinate equilibria. However, monetary and fiscal policies can be used as an equilibrium selection device. We find that, with a low inflation target, active monetary policies are more likely to deliver real and nominal determinacy and further amplify the effectiveness of these policies in reducing steady state inflation.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: taxes; inflation; secondary markets, liquidity premium.
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation

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