The Effect of Inequality Aversion on a Climate Coalition Formation: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Lin, Yu-Hsuan (2017): The Effect of Inequality Aversion on a Climate Coalition Formation: Theory and Experimental Evidence. Published in: Economics of International Environmental Agreements: A Critical Approach (January 2017): pp. 61-76.

Abstract

This chapter examines the impact of inequality-averse attitudes on the individual incentives of participating in international environmental agreements by a laboratory experiment. The experimental result shows that the inequality-averse attitudes have significantly positive impact on the incentives of participation. Particularly, when they are non-critical players, egalitarians are likely to give up the free riding benefit by joining a coalition. It helps us to understand the coalition formation in the international conventions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Social preference, experimental design, international environmental agreement, inequality aversion, heterogeneous countries
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q0 - General > Q01 - Sustainable Development; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q58 - Government Policy

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