Stackelberg equilibrium in duopoly: strategic use of corporate social responsibility

Sharma, Ajay (2017): Stackelberg equilibrium in duopoly: strategic use of corporate social responsibility.

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that in a duopoly model with firms being concerned about profit as well as corporate social responsibility (CSR), the outcome of game may coincide with the Stackelberg outcome. We argue that owner of the firm may use CSR orientation as a strategy to become Stackelberg leader in the quantity competition game.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Stackelberg outcome; Corporate social responsibility; Cournot game; Duopoly; Non-profit orientation
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L10 - General; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L20 - General

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