Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Envyfree solutions, Nonlinear equilibrium and Egalitarianequivalence for the Package Assignment Problem.
This is the latest version of this item.

PDF
MPRA_paper_8498.pdf Download (86kB)  Preview 
Abstract
The first result in this paper says that given any efficient nonmonetary allocation there is a balanced vector of transfers so that the resulting allocation is fair. The second result here says that given any efficient nonmonetary allocation there is a pricing function defined on consumption bundles and a balanced vector of transfers so that they together form a nonlinear market equilibrium. The first result is used to establish the second. Subsequently we prove the existence of egalitarian equivalent solutions for package assignment problems and shows that they satisfy the “fair share guaranteed” property.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Envyfree solutions, Nonlinear equilibrium and Egalitarianequivalence for the Package Assignment Problem 
Language:  English 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C79  Other D  Microeconomics > D6  Welfare Economics > D63  Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement 
Item ID:  8498 
Depositing User:  Somdeb Lahiri 
Date Deposited:  28 Apr 2008 07:14 
Last Modified:  09 Oct 2019 20:26 
References:  1. Alkan, A., G. Demage and D. Gale (1991): “Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice”, Econometrica, 59, 10231029. 2. Aragones, E. (1992): “A Derivation of the Money Rawlsian Solution”, Social Choice and Welfare 12, 267276. 3. Bevia, C. (1998): “Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods”, Review of Economic Design 3, 195213. 4. Bikhchandani, S. and J.W. Mamer (1997): “Competitive equilibrium in an economy with indivisibilities”, Journal of Economic Theory, 74, 385413. 5. Bikhchandani, S. and J.M. Ostroy (2002): “The Package Assignment Model”, Journal of Economic Theory, 107, 377406. 6. Brams, S. J. and A. D. Taylor (1996): “Fair Division: From cakecutting to dispute resolution”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 7. Foley, D. (1967): “Resource Allocation and the Public Sector”, Yale Economic Essays, 7 (1), 4598. 8. Gul, F. and E. Stacchetti (1997): “Walrasian equilibrium without complementarities”, Technical report, Princeton University and University of Michigan. 9. Keslo, A.S. and V.P. Crawford (1982): “Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes”, Econometrica 50, 14831504. 10. Koopmans, T. and M. Beckmann (1957): “Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities”, Econometrica, 25, 5375. 11. Lahiri, S. (2006): “Existence of Market Equilibrium for Multiunit Auctions”, (unpublished). 12. Lahiri, S. (2007): “The Value Function Theorem for Combinatorial Auctions and a New Proof of the Existence of Market Equilibrium for HouseAuctions”, unpublished. 13. Moulin, H. (1995): “Cooperative Microeconomics: A GameTheoretic Introduction”, Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, London. 14. Pazner, E. and D. Schmeidler (1978): “EgalitarianEquivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92, 671687. 15. Robertson, J. and W. Webb (1998): “CakeCutting Algorithms: Be Fair if You Can”, A. K. Peters, 1998. 16. Varian, H. (1974): “Equity, Envy and Efficiency”, Journal of Economic Theory, 29, 217244. 17. Wurman, P.R. and M.P. Wellman (undated): “Equilibrium Prices in Bundle Auctions”. 
URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/8498 
Available Versions of this Item

Envyfree solutions, Nonlinear equilibrium and Egalitarianequivalence for the Package Assignment Problem. (deposited 25 Apr 2008 14:48)
 Envyfree solutions, Nonlinear equilibrium and Egalitarianequivalence for the Package Assignment Problem. (deposited 28 Apr 2008 07:14) [Currently Displayed]