Monetary policy coordination leader followership

Raputsoane, Leroi (2018): Monetary policy coordination leader followership.

Abstract

This paper analyses the leader followership phenomenon in monetary policy coordination in South Africa, the Advanced, Developed and Emerging counties. The coordination of monetary policy in Advanced counties is examined in individual countries while such coordination in Developed and Emerging countries is examined in groups of countries. These countries comprise South Africa, United States, Euro area, United Kingdom and Japan while the groups of countries comprise the Developed, BRIC, Eastern Europe, East Asia and Latin American countries. The results show that monetary policy coordination is led by the United States and Developed countries, that monetary policy coordination in United Kingdom, Eastern European countries and the Euro area is intermediate while South Africa and Latin America are followers in monetary policy coordination. The results further show that Japan, BRIC and Eastern Europe coordinate monetary policy independent of the rest of the selected countries.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Central bank, Monetary policy, Causal Inference
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C11 - Bayesian Analysis: General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E43 - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies

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