Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Game-theoretic model of tax evasion: analysis of agents’ interaction and optimization of tax burden

Sokolovskyi, Dmytro (2018): Game-theoretic model of tax evasion: analysis of agents’ interaction and optimization of tax burden.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_86415.pdf

Download (378kB) | Preview

Abstract

The article analyzes a tax evasion problem using game-theoretic tools. The model develops a well-known Alligham–Sandmo classic model by introducing parameters of “transparency” of detected violations, of cost of control, of tax evasion and of conscientious tax payment. For that model we calculated Nash-equilibrium conditions in pure strategies. Based on this we investigated the problem of optimization of real tax burden. It is shown that curve describing the dependence between actual tax burden from declared one has not 1 (like the Laffer curve), but 3 local maxima. Those findings may contribute to better calculation of tax burden in the real economy.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.