Political Cycles, Government Spending, and Efficiency of Indonesia' Local Governments

Chalil, Tengku Munawar (2018): Political Cycles, Government Spending, and Efficiency of Indonesia' Local Governments.

Abstract

The paper presents a test of the relationship between rational political cycles with the government spending behavior and its efficiency by using extensive data set of whole Indonesian municipalities/cities from 2008-2014. The results show that politicians/local leaders in Indonesia tend to maximize their preference during the election year but anticipate the election time through strategy to deceive voters.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: election, political cycles, government expenditure
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty > I31 - General Welfare, Well-Being

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