Stackelberg Mixed Triopoly Games with State-Owned, Labour-Managed and Capitalist Firms

Ohnishi, Kazuhiro (2018): Stackelberg Mixed Triopoly Games with State-Owned, Labour-Managed and Capitalist Firms.

Abstract

This paper investigates three sequential-move games with a capitalist firm, a labour-managed firm and a state-owned firm. The first game is as follows. In stage one, the capitalist firm chooses its output level. In stage two, the other firms choose their output levels simultaneously and independently. In stage three, the market opens and all firms sell their outputs. The structures of the second and third games are nearly identical and differ only in order in which the firms choose output levels in the first two stages. The paper discusses the equilibrium outcomes of the three sequential-move games.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Stackelberg games; Capitalist firm; Labour-managed firm; State-owned firm
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory; L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L30 - General

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