Wage-Rise Contract and Labour-Managed Cournot Oligopoly with Complementary Goods

Ohnishi, Kazuhiro (2018): Wage-Rise Contract and Labour-Managed Cournot Oligopoly with Complementary Goods.

Abstract

This paper considers a quantity-setting oligopoly model with complementary goods where labour-managed firms are allowed to offer wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment. The following two stages are considered. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to adopt a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment device. In the second stage, each firm independently chooses and sells its actual output. The paper analyses the equilibrium of the labour-managed oligopoly model.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Cournot competition; Labour-managed oligopoly; Wage-rise contract; Complementary goods
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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