Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Wage-Rise Contract and Labour-Managed Cournot Oligopoly with Complementary Goods

Ohnishi, Kazuhiro (2018): Wage-Rise Contract and Labour-Managed Cournot Oligopoly with Complementary Goods.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_88235.pdf

Download (223kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper considers a quantity-setting oligopoly model with complementary goods where labour-managed firms are allowed to offer wage-rise contracts as a strategic commitment. The following two stages are considered. In the first stage, each firm independently decides whether or not to adopt a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment device. In the second stage, each firm independently chooses and sells its actual output. The paper analyses the equilibrium of the labour-managed oligopoly model.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.