Crowdfunding in a duopoly under asymmetric information

Miglo, Anton (2018): Crowdfunding in a duopoly under asymmetric information.

Abstract

Traditionally crowdfunding has been used for funding very innovative projects. Recently, however, companies have begun using crowdfunding to finance more traditional products where they compete against other sellers of similar products. One of the major platforms Indiegogo launched several projects consistent with this trend. This paper offers a model of a duopoly where firms can use crowdfunding prior to direct sales. The model is based on asymmetric information between competitors regarding the demand for the product. It provides several implications that have not yet been tested. For example we find that high-demand firms can use crowdfunding to signal their quality.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: crowdfunding, asymmetric information, reward-based crowdfunding, duopoly, signalling
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L26 - Entrepreneurship; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M1 - Business Administration > M13 - New Firms ; Startups

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