The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure

Gómez-Rúa, María and Vidal-Puga, Juan (2008): The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure.

Abstract

We study three values for transferable utility games with coalition structure, including the Owen coalitional value and two weighted versions with weights given by the size of the coalitions. We provide three axiomatic characterizations using the properties of Efficiency, Linearity, Independence of Null Coalitions, and Coordination, with two versions of Balanced Contributions inside a Coalition and Weighted Sharing in Unanimity Games, respectively.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: coalition structure; coalitional value
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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