Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Stackelberg type dynamic zero-sum game with leader and follower

Tanaka, Yasuhito (2018): Stackelberg type dynamic zero-sum game with leader and follower.

[img] PDF
MPRA_paper_89612.pdf

Download (41kB)

Abstract

We consider a Stackelberg type dynamic two-players zero-sum game. One of two players is the leader and the other player is the follower. The game is a two-stages game. In the first stage the leader determines the value of its strategic variable. In the second stage the follower determines the value of its strategic variable given the value of the leader's strategic variable. On the other hand, in the static game two players simultaneously determine the values of their strategic variable. We will show that Sion's minimax theorem (Sion(1958)) implies that at the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic zero-sum game with a leader and a follower the roles of leader and follower are irrelevant to the payoffs of players, and that the Stackelberg equilbria of the dynamic game are equivalent to the equilibrium of the static game.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.