Dillenberger, David and Sadowski, Philipp (2008): Ashamed to be Selfish.
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Abstract
We study a two-stage choice problem, where alternatives are allocations between the decision maker (DM) and a passive recipient. The recipient observes choice behavior in stage two, while stage one choice is unobserved. Choosing selfishly in stage two, in the face of a fairer available alternative, may inflict shame on DM. DM has preferences over sets of alternatives that represent period two choices. We axiomatize a representation that identifies DM's selfish ranking, her norm of fairness and shame. Altruism is the most prominent motive that can explain non-selfish choice. We identify a condition under which shame to be selfish can mimic altruism, when only stage-two choice is observed by the experimenter. An additional condition implies that the norm of fairness can be characterized as the Nash solution of a bargaining game induced by the second-stage choice problem. The representation is generalized to allow for finitely many recipients and applied to explain a social decision maker's incentive for obfuscation.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Ashamed to be Selfish |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General |
Item ID: | 9020 |
Depositing User: | David Dillenberger |
Date Deposited: | 08 Jun 2008 05:17 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 17:09 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/9020 |
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Ashamed to be Selfish. (deposited 20 Apr 2008 05:34)
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