Kartele jako przedmiot polityki gospodarczej

Karbowski, Adam and Kryśkiewicz, Łukasz and Prokop, Jacek (2018): Kartele jako przedmiot polityki gospodarczej. Published in: M. Strojny (red.), Wyzwania ekonomiczne dla Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Warszawa: SGH , Vol. 1, No. 1 (2018)

Abstract

The present article shows and discusses the economic problems of market cartelization, and perceives cartels as objects of public policy and interest. In this paper, the term ‘cartel’ has been profoundly explained and elaborated, and the selected examples of industry cartelization, coming both from the Polish national economy and economy of the whole European Union, have been presented. Next, the discussion has been set in relevant economic theories that allow to interpret cartel behavior from the viewpoint of regulators (policy-makers) or in the light of collusion detection mechanisms.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Cartels in Public Policy Perspective
• Language: Polish
• Keywords: Cartels; Public Policy
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law

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