Family firms and labour productivity: the role of enterprise-level bargaining in the Italian economy

Damiani, Mirella and Pompei, Fabrizio and Ricci, Andrea (2018): Family firms and labour productivity: the role of enterprise-level bargaining in the Italian economy. Published in: Journal of Small Business Management , Vol. 56, No. 4 (October 2018): pp. 573-600.

Abstract

We investigate the role of Italian firms in labour productivity performance. We find that family-owned firms have lower labour productivity than their non-family counterparts. In a second step, we estimate the role of firm-level bargaining (FLB) to determine whether family-controlled firms that adopt this type of bargaining may partially close the gap in terms of labour productivity with their non-family competitors. Our results, obtained through IV estimation to control for endogeneity bias, suggest that enterprises under family governance achieve significant labour productivity gains — greater than those achieved by their non-family counterparts — when they adopt firm-level bargaining.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Family firms, corporate governance, labour productivity, firm-level bargaining
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance

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