On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency

Bergantiños, Gustavo and Massó, Jordi and Neme, Alejandro (2019): On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency. Published in: Theory and Decision No. 84 (2018): pp. 83-97.

Abstract

We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, plurality voting, Borda methods and Condorcet winners to our setting from the point of view of their consistency and internal stability properties.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Internal Stability; Consistency; Efficiency; Anonymity, Neutrality; Participation
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory

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