Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2008): Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket.
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In this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital-intern markets) with an aftermarket. We analyze the Nash equilibria of capacity allocation games, in which preferences of hospitals and interns are common knowledge and every hospital determines a quota for the regular market given its total capacity for the two matching periods. Under the intern-optimal stable matching system, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist. Common preferences for hospitals ensure the existence of equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies whereas unlike in games of capacity manipulation strong monotonicity of population is not a sufficient restriction on preferences to avoid the nonexistence problem. Besides, in games of capacity allocation, it is not true either that every hospital weakly prefers a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to any larger regular market quota profiles.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket|
|Keywords:||Many-to-one matching; hospital-intern market; aftermarket; capacity allocation game|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Ayşe Mumcu|
|Date Deposited:||20. Jun 2008 00:33|
|Last Modified:||22. Feb 2013 18:39|
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