Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Quasiseparable aggregation in games with common local utilities

Kukushkin, Nikolai (2019): Quasiseparable aggregation in games with common local utilities.

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Abstract

Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is an aggregate of local utilities obtained from the use of certain "facilities." All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. Individual improvements in such a game are acyclic if a "trimness" condition is satisfied by every facility and all aggregation rules are consistent with a separable ordering. Those conditions are satisfied, for instance, by bottleneck congestion games with an infinite set of facilities. Under appropriate additional assumptions, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is established.

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