DiGabriele, Jim and Ojo, Marianne (2017): The efficiency wage hypothesis and the role of corporate governance in firm performance. Forthcoming in: IGI Global
PDF
MPRA_paper_94914.pdf Download (246kB) |
Abstract
Implications of the digital economy and its impact on the Economics of Employment in the 21st Century are reflected through lower wages which have been fueled through the rise of Information Technology, with the consequential advents of phenomena such as the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the rise of emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, block chain systems, Vertical Integration, Hyper-focused specialty lending, Lender-fintech partnerships, New engagement models, Product Innovation, to name but a few.
As well as a consideration of the two-fold contribution to the literature, as highlighted in their paper, “Financial Disruptions and the Cyclical Upgrading of Labor” (2017:6), and elaborated on by Epstein et al (2017:6-8), the reconciliation of two quantitative limitations of current general equilibrium theories constituting part of such contribution, is also re iterated.
The inability to account for variables which are independent of exogenously or endogenously determined factors and which are outside their model, also necessitates the incorporation of other theories and factors to be taken into account in arriving at more accurate conclusions which determine firm performance.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | The efficiency wage hypothesis and the role of corporate governance in firm performance |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | efficiency wage hypothesis; pro cyclicality; financial cycles; firm performance; corporate governance |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M4 - Accounting and Auditing |
Item ID: | 94914 |
Depositing User: | Dr Marianne Ojo |
Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2019 20:30 |
Last Modified: | 04 Oct 2019 20:14 |
References: | Anderson, R.C, Sattar A. Mansi and Reeb, D.M., (2004). “Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of Debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol 37, 315-342 Akerlof, G. (1982).”Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov 1987, Vol 97, pp 543-569 Auer, R.A., and A.M. Fischer (2010): “The Effects of Low-Wage Import Competition , U.S Inflationary Pressure” Journal of Monetray Economics, 57 pp 491-503 Auer, R.A, and A. Mehrotra (2014): “ Trade Linkages and the Globalisation of Inflation in Asia and the Pacific” BIS Working papers Auer, R.A., K. Degen, and A.M Fischer (2013): “Low Wage Import Competition, Inflationary Pressure, and Industry Dynamics in Europe,” European Economic Review, 59, pp141-66 Bhagat, S. and Bolton, B. (2007). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance. June 2007 Demsetz, H. (1983).” The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol 26 pages 375-390 Devereaux, M. and J Yetman (2014). “Capital Controls, Global Liquidity Traps and the International Policy Trilemma, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 116 (1) pp 158-189 DiGabriele, J. A., “The Expectation Differences Among Stakeholders in the Financial Valuation Fitness of Auditors DiGabriele, J.A. and Ojo. M.(2014). “The Dual Roles of External Auditors and Forensic Accountants”. Journal of Investigative and Forensic Accounting (formerly Journal of Forensic Accounting) Epstein et al (2017). “Financial Disruptions and the Cyclical Upgrading of Labor” Fama, E.F. (1980). “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” Journal of Political Economy, Vol 88, pages 288-307 Federal Reserve, (2019). Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Remarks by Randal K. Quarles Vice Chair for Supervision Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System at “Developments in Empirical Macroeconomics,” a research conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Washington, D.C. May 30, 2019 Hermalin, B. and Weisbach (M). (2007). “Transparency and Corporate Governance” University of California and University of Illinois Working paper Huber, W.D. and DiGabriele, J.A. “Research in Forensic Accounting – What Matters?) Huber, W.D. (2001). “Culture and Corruption: Using Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions to Explain Perceptions of Corruption” Iscoviello, M (2015). “Financial Business Cycles” Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol 18 (1), pp 140 - 163 Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 3 305-360 Jermann, U. and Quadrinni, V. (2012). “Macro Economic Effects of Financial Shocks” American Economic Review, Vol 102 (1) pp 238 -271 Kranacher, M.J. Riley, R. & Wells, J.T. (2011). Forensic Accounting and Fraud Examination Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley Ojo, M. (2006). The Audit Expectations Gap. Journal of Forensic Accounting Ojo M, (2013).Audits, Audit Quality and Signaling Mechanisms: Concentrated Ownership Structures“ Rey, H. (2013). “Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence” Federal Resrve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole Symposium, Aug Rojas-Suarez L ,. (2002). „Rating Banks in Emerging Markets: What Credit Agencies Should Learn From Financial Indicators” Schularick, M and AM Taylor (2012). “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crisis, American Economic Review 1870 -2008, April Yellen, J. (1984). “ The Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment, American Economic Review Volume 57 pp 401 - 405 |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/94914 |