Dubovik, Andrei (2018): Mergers on Networks.
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Abstract
I study mergers where each firm owns multiple shops across a country. Presently, the European Commission views every shop, together with the shops from its catchment area, as an isolated market. Such an approach is internally inconsistent. I show how to extend the European Commission's approach to consistently take overlaps in catchment areas into account. My model is a specialization of the existing network theory that is aimed to be feasible in real merger cases. As a demonstration, I study a past merger case and I find that neglecting overlaps in catchment areas can result in substantial biases.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Mergers on Networks |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | mergers, networks, spatial competition, consumer demand |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L40 - General |
Item ID: | 95458 |
Depositing User: | Dr. Andrei Dubovik |
Date Deposited: | 16 Aug 2019 11:45 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 03:22 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/95458 |