Commitment and matching in the marriage market

Berliant, Marcus and Thakur, Sounak (2019): Commitment and matching in the marriage market.

Abstract

The set of stable marriage matches is different depending on whether allocation within marriage is determined by binding agreements in the marriage market (BAMM) or by bargaining in marriage (BIM). With transferable utility, any stable matching is utilitarian efficient under BAMM, but not under BIM. Is it possible to implement the efficient matching under BIM? We show that if one side of the market is sufficiently sensitive relative to the other, if the more sensitive side can be ranked by sensitivity, and if their preferences are hierarchical, the top trading cycles algorithm results in an efficient matching.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Two-sided matching; Marriage; Bargaining
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J12 - Marriage ; Marital Dissolution ; Family Structure ; Domestic Abuse

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