Kim, Minseong (2019): Firms as problem solvers: economics meets computer science.
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Abstract
A theory of the firm based on the idea that firms are problem solvers is developed. A network of firms and hierarchical structure of an individual firm are analyzed in terms of distributed and parallel computing. This framework, based on notions of computer science, allows us a simple answer to why a network of firms exists instead of a network of individuals.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Firms as problem solvers: economics meets computer science |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | theory of the firm; vertical integration; parallel computing; distributed computing; synchronization |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D20 - General D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D40 - General L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L20 - General |
Item ID: | 97332 |
Depositing User: | Minseong Kim |
Date Deposited: | 02 Dec 2019 10:16 |
Last Modified: | 02 Dec 2019 10:16 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/97332 |