Firms as problem solvers: economics meets computer science

Kim, Minseong (2019): Firms as problem solvers: economics meets computer science.

Abstract

A theory of the firm based on the idea that firms are problem solvers is developed. A network of firms and hierarchical structure of an individual firm are analyzed in terms of distributed and parallel computing. This framework, based on notions of computer science, allows us a simple answer to why a network of firms exists instead of a network of individuals.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: theory of the firm; vertical integration; parallel computing; distributed computing; synchronization
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D20 - General; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D40 - General; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L20 - General

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