Licensing probabilistic Patents: The duopoly case.

Vargas Barrenechea, Martin (2008): Licensing probabilistic Patents: The duopoly case.

Abstract

In this work we study licensing games of non drastic innovations under the shadow of probabilistic patents. We study the situation of a insider innovator that get a new reduction cost innovation and acts in a duopoly market under Cournout competition. When the property rights are not ironclad the potential licensee additional to the option of use the backstop technology instead of the new technology ,has the option of infringe the patent. Under infringement the patent holder can sue the infringer in a court and if its successful could get a order of damages payment. Then when the infringer decides about what kind of technology to use the infringement is always better than to use the backstop technology then a difference of the ironclad licensing games probabilistic rights, change the threats points and makes attractive for the patent holder just to license big innovations under the Lost Profit rule.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Patents; innovation economics; probabilistic property rights; damage rules
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L0 - General; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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