Should regulators always be transparent? A bank run experiment

Chakravarty, Surajeet and Choo, Lawrence and Fonseca, Miguel A. and Kaplan, Todd R. (2020): Should regulators always be transparent? A bank run experiment.

Abstract

We study, using laboratory experiments, the extent to which disclosure policies about the financial health of a bank affect the likelihood of a bank run. We consider two disclosure regimes, full disclosure and no disclosure, under two scenarios: one in which the bank is on average financially solvent and another in which the bank is on average insolvent. When the bank is on average insolvent, the full disclosure regime reduces the expected likelihood of runs. In contrast, when the bank is on average solvent, the full disclosure regime increases the expected likelihood of runs. Our evidence illustrates the importance of contemporary financial disclosure regulations.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Bank runs, Banking crises, Public policy, Information disclosure.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages

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