Manipulation of market equilibrium via endowments

Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Manipulation of market equilibrium via endowments.

Abstract

In this paper we show that in an exchange economy with quasi-linear preferences it is possible to manipulate market equilibrium by destroying and withholding ones initial endowments.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C79 - Other

References

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