Competition policy, cartel enforcement and leniency program

Samà, Danilo (2008): Competition policy, cartel enforcement and leniency program.

Abstract

The present assessment focuses on the antitrust action in detecting and fighting oligopolistic collusion, analyzing the development of the innovative and modern leniency policy. Following the examination of the main conditions and reasons for cartel stability and sustainability, our attempt is to comprehend under which circumstances leniency program represents a functional and successful tool for preventing the formation of anti-competitive agreements.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: cartels enforcement, competition policy, game theory, leniency program, oligopolistic markets
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K21 - Antitrust Law; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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