Persuasion, Spillovers, and Government Interventions

Li, Cheng and Xiao, Yancheng (2020): Persuasion, Spillovers, and Government Interventions.

Abstract

We develop a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers to investigate the impact of information production on optimal policy design. A sender produces information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects, and the government implements corrective subsidies and taxes to maximize social welfare. Subsidies to the sender’s preferred action incentivize her to produce less information, while taxes motivating her to produce more. Such an informational effect impacts the receiver’s decision and social welfare. We show that the optimal corrective subsidies and taxes may be different from the Pigouvian level. Most notably, the optimal policy is no government intervention when the spillover is positive and small.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: persuasion; spillover effects; externalities; Pigouvian taxes; subsidies; social welfare
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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