Attainment of Equilibrium: Marshallian Path Adjustment and Buyer Determinism

Collins, Sean M. and James, Duncan and Servátka, Maroš and Vadovič, Radovan (2020): Attainment of Equilibrium: Marshallian Path Adjustment and Buyer Determinism.

Abstract

We examine equilibration in a market where Marshallian path adjustment can be enforced, or not, as a treatment: a posted offer market either with buyer queueing via value order, or random order, respectively. We derive equilibrium predictions, and run experiments crossing queueing rules with either human or deterministically optimizing robot buyers under both locally stationary and nonstationary marginal cost. Results on rate of convergence to competitive equilibrium are obtained, and Marshallian path adjustment is established as conducive to attaining competitive equilibrium.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: laboratory experiment, Marshallian path adjustment, equilibration, markets
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C4 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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