Comparative institutional analysis of poverty-alleviation systems

Kurita, Kenichi (2021): Comparative institutional analysis of poverty-alleviation systems.

Abstract

This paper conducts a comparative institutional analysis of welfare benefits programs and basic income under the balanced budget condition. The result shows that when basic income is low, it yields higher social welfare than welfare benefits. Also, the equilibrium employment under the basic income system is larger than that under welfare benefits programs when the welfare benefits level is lower than the critical level.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Comparative institutional analysis; Basic Income; Welfare benefit
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty

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