The future of the Central Bank and its autonomy in the Chilean Constitutional Convention

Castro Azócar, Felipe (2021): The future of the Central Bank and its autonomy in the Chilean Constitutional Convention.

Abstract

Regarding the discussion on a New Constitution in Chile, the debate on the autonomy of the Central Bank has polarized: Some consider it fundamental for macroeconomic balances, and others question it as an "authoritarian enclave". Should the Constitution settle this issue? It will be seen that it is not so much what it says on paper that matters, but how the autonomy and independence of the Central Bank are articulated in the reality.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Constitutional autonomy; Central Bank autonomy; price stability; Chilean new constitution; economic policy
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook; K - Law and Economics > K0 - General; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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