Increasing Autonomy in Charitable Giving: The Effect of Choosing the Number of Recipients on Donations

Fehérová, Martina and Heger, Stephanie and Péliová, Jana and Servátka, Maroš and Slonim, Robert (2022): Increasing Autonomy in Charitable Giving: The Effect of Choosing the Number of Recipients on Donations.

Abstract

In many contexts people can choose how many charities to help. This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment that varies whether the subjects have a choice in the number of charities to donate to and whether they are given an option to opt out. We find that the choice increases donation frequency but does not influence donation amounts. If the choice also includes the opt-out option, there is no increase in the donation frequency or amount.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Altruism, Choice, Charitable Giving, Choice Architecture, Opt-out
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy

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