Communication and heterogeneity in a commons dilemma: an experimental approach

Wakamatsu, Mihoko and Managi, Shunsuke (2020): Communication and heterogeneity in a commons dilemma: an experimental approach.

Abstract

Heterogeneity is considered harmful for cooperation in common-pool resource extraction. In this study, we focus on the heterogeneity of users and communication, among the factors related to the success that are organized as Ostrom’s enabling conditions. We use laboratory experiments to separately identify the effect of different formats of communication in a commons dilemma with user heterogeneity. This paper modifies the standard common-pool resources (CPR) game to represent the situation where two groups of users with different utility functions are spatially linked in the CPR. An example of this situation would be an upstream community that appropriates a river’s water resource, which results in a change in the quantity or quality of the river, through pollution or extraction, to the downstream community that also utilizes the river. We will test the effect of communication in this environment.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Common-pool resource, Communication, Heterogeneity, Spatial externality
• Subjects: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation

References

Baland, J.-M., & Platteau, J.-P. (1996). Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities? : Food & Agriculture Organization. Balliet, D. (2009). Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analytic Review:. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(1), 39-57. doi:10.1177_0022002709352443 Blanco, E., Haller, T., & Walker, J. M. (2018). Provision of environmental public goods: Unconditional and conditional donations from outsiders. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 92, 815-831. Bland, J., & Nikiforakis, N. (2015). Coordination with third-party externalities. European Economic Review, 80, 1-15. Brick, K., Visser, M., & Hoven, Z. V. d. (2015). Cooperation and Climate Change: Can Communication Facilitate the Provision of Public Goods in Heterogeneous Settings? Environmental and Resource Economics, 64(3), 421-443. doi:doi:10.1007/s10640-015-9879-z Buckley, E., & Croson, R. (2006). Income and wealth heterogeneity in the voluntary provision of linear public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 90(4), 935-955. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.06.002 Buckley, N. J., Mestelman, S., Muller, R. A., Schott, S., & Zhang, J. (2017). The Effects of Communication on the Partnership Solution to the Commons. Environmental and Resource Economics, 70(2), 363-380. doi:doi:10.1007/s10640-017-0124-9 Chan, K. S., Mestelman, S., Moir, R., & Muller, R. A. (1999). Heterogeneity and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods | SpringerLink. Experimental Economics, 2(1). doi:10.1023/A:1009984414401 Chaudhuri, A., & Paichayontvijit, T. (2017). On the long-run efficacy of punishments and recommendations in a laboratory public goods game. Scientific Reports, 7(1), 1-8. doi:doi:10.1038/s41598-017-12490-5 Delaney, J., & Jacobson, S. (2014). Those outsiders:How downstream externalities affect public good provision Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 67, 340–352. Evdokimov, P., & Garfagnini, U. (2017). Third-party manipulation of conflict: an experiment. Experimental Economics, 21(1), 27-49. doi:doi:10.1007/s10683-017-9523-6 Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments | SpringerLink. Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171-178. doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4 Hackett, S., Schlager, E., & Walker, J. (1994). The Role of Communication in Resolving Commons Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence with Heterogeneous Appropriators. 27, 99-126. Janssen, M. A., Anderies, J. M., & Joshi, S. R. (2011). Coordination and cooperation in asymmetric commons dilemmas. Experimental Economics, 14(4), 547-566. doi:doi:10.1007/s10683-011-9281-9 Libecap, G. D., & Wiggins, S. N. (1984). Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production. The American Economic Review, 74(1), 87-98. Ostrom, E. (2006). The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 61(2), 149-163. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.02.008 Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible. The American Political Science Review, 86(2), 404-417. doi:10.2307/1964229 Robbett, A. (2016). Sustaining cooperation in heterogeneous groups. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 132, 121-138. Sanchirico, J. N., & Wilen, J. E. (1999). Bioeconomics of Spatial Exploitation in a Patchy Environment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 37(2), 129-150. doi:10.1006/jeem.1998.1060 Sanchirico, J. N., & Wilen, J. E. (2005). Optimal spatial management of renewable resources: matching policy scope to ecosystem scale. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50, 23-46. Schnier, K. E. (2009). Spatial externalities and the common-pool resource mechanism. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70(1-2), 402-415. doi:10.1016/J.JEBO.2009.02.004 Walker, J. M., Gardner, R., & Ostrom, E. (1990). Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 19(3), 203-211. doi:10.1016/0095-0696(90)90069-B