External sovereign debt restructurings: Delay and replay

Graf Von Luckner, Clemens and Meyer, Josefin and Reinhart, Carmen and Trebesch, Christoph (2021): External sovereign debt restructurings: Delay and replay. Published in: VoxEU (30 March 2021): pp. 1-7.

Abstract

Today, more than half of low-income countries eligible for relief under the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) are either in debt distress or at high risk. Several emerging markets have either recently restructured (Argentina and Ecuador) or remain in default (Lebanon, Surinam, and Venezuela). In this context, we review some of the features of external sovereign debt restructurings. We show that default spells are lengthy and that the road to debt-crisis resolution is often littered with serial restructuring agreements.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: external debt, default, crises, restructuring
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook; F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance; G - Financial Economics > G0 - General > G01 - Financial Crises

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