The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents

Behringer, Stefan (2008): The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents.

Abstract

This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. What distinguishes the public good investigated in this analysis is its direct provision technology which is commonplace in modern information technologies.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Public Goods, Direct Provision, Asymmetric Information, Mechanism Design, Open Source Software
• Subjects: B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B21 - Microeconomics; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods; H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents > H30 - General

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