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On Principal Agents, Rogue Agencies and Systemic Government Failure: A Case Study

Otterson, James (2023): On Principal Agents, Rogue Agencies and Systemic Government Failure: A Case Study.

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Abstract

This note sums up a US Congress Committee Investigation Report (CIR) on abuses carried out by intelligence agents of the Department of Commerce (DOC) over the last twenty years. We also consider some possible background contexts underlining the issues covered by the CIR along with preventive policy considerations. In terms of economic theory, this is an account of how principal agents built a rogue government agency that potentially triggered a systemic failure of part of the US government. We consider the mechanisms that enabled the underlining principal agent problems and mitigating factors for each given mechanism.

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