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The Imperfections of Conditional Programs and the Case for Universal Basic Income

Guimarães, Luis and Lourenço, Diogo (2024): The Imperfections of Conditional Programs and the Case for Universal Basic Income.

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Abstract

How costly are the imperfections of conditional welfare programs? Should we replace these programs with a Universal Basic Income (UBI)? We answer these questions using a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets, accounting for three overlooked imperfections of real-life conditional programs: incomplete take-up, illegitimate transfers, and administrative costs. We find that these imperfections, especially incomplete take-up, significantly reduce welfare. Also, diverting almost half of the current welfare expenditure to finance a UBI would maximize welfare by mitigating distortions and reaching those in the dead angle of conditional programs. Conditional programs and UBI are, then, complementary policy instruments, a finding unveiled by accounting for the imperfections of conditional programs.

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