Random Marginal and Random Removal values

Calvo, Emilio (2006): Random Marginal and Random Removal values.

Abstract

We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a). These strategic games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: The random marginal and the random removal values. The main characteristic of these proposals is that they always select a unique payoff allocation in NTU-games. The random marginal value coincides with the Consistent NTU-value (Maschler and Owen, 1989) for hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley, 1953). The random removal coincides with the solidarity value (Novak and Radzik, 1994) in TU-games. In large games it is showed that, in the special class of market games, the random marginal coincides with the Shapley NTU-value (Shapley,1969), and that the random removal coincides with the equal split solution.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Shapley value; NTU-games; large market games
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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