les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?

Langlais, Eric (2009): les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?

Abstract

This papers studies three questions. What do we know about criminals 'preferences ? How should we represent such preferences ? What are the consequences for law enforcement policies ?

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Are criminals risk-seeking individulas ?
• Language: French
• Keywords: aversion au risque, sanctions monétaires et non monétaires; préférences State-Dependent, économie de la criminalité, dissuasion
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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