Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in the NIMBY context

Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy and Leroux, Justin (2009): Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in the NIMBY context.

Abstract

The siting of public facilities, such as prisons, airports or incinerators for hazardous waste typically faces social rejection by local populations (the "NIMBY" syndrome, for Not In My BackYard). These public goods exhibit a private bad aspect which creates an asymmetry: all involved communities benet from their existence, but only one (the host community) bears the local negative externality. We view the siting problem as a cost sharing issue and provide an axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in this context. The set of axioms we introduce are specically designed to overcome the asymmetry of the problem.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Public goods; Externalities; NIMBY; Location; Cost sharing
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods

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