A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities

Marini, Marco A. and Currarini, Sergio (2003): A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities. Published in: Koray S. and Sertel, M. R. (eds.), pp.233-250, Advances in Economic Design, Springer Verlag, Berlin & London (2003): pp. 233-251.

Abstract

This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a ”first mover advantage”. We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is nonempty in games with strategic complements. We apply this result to Cournot and Bertrand games and to public goods economies.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Faculty of Economics, University of Urbino "Carlo Bo"
• Language: English
• Keywords: Core; cooperative games; externalities
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

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