Osiris Jorge, Parcero and Adolfo, Cristobal-Campoamor (2009): Dynamics of neighborhood formation and segregation by income.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_16936.pdf Download (745kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This paper analyzes some determinant conditions under which neighborhood formation gives rise to segregation by income. In contrast to the literature, we explore the sequential arrival of poor and rich individuals to neighborhoods exploited by oligopolistic land developers. These developers try to maximize a discounted flow of lot prices during neighborhood formation, taking advantage of the local externalities generated by the rich and the poor. Under a speedy arrival of new potential inhabitants and/or low discount rates, competing developers are more likely to concentrate rich people in the same neighborhood. This happens because the benefits from early agglomeration are outweighed by a more profitable matching of rich neighbors within nearby lots.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Dynamics of neighborhood formation and segregation by income |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | land developers; segregation; income distribution; arrival rates |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R2 - Household Analysis > R21 - Housing Demand |
Item ID: | 16936 |
Depositing User: | Adolfo Cristobal-Campoamor |
Date Deposited: | 25 Aug 2009 14:37 |
Last Modified: | 05 Oct 2019 16:39 |
References: | Bayer, P.; Fang, H. and McMillan, R. (2005). Separate when equal? Racial inequality and residential segregation. NBER WP. No. 11507. August 2005. Becker, G. and Murphy, K. (2000). Social Economics. Market behavior in a social environment. Belknap/Harvard. Benabou, R. (1993). Workings of a city: location, education and production. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no.3 (August): 619-652. De Bartolome, C. (1990). Equilibrium and inefficiency in a community model with peer group effects. Journal of Political Economy 98, no.1 (February): 110-133. Durlauf, S. (1996). A theory of persistent income inequality. Journal of Economic Growth, 1: 75-93 (March, 1996). Henderson, J. V. and Thisse, J. F. (2001). On strategic community development. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 109, no.3. Lundberg, S. and Startz, R. (2007). Information and Racial Exclusion. Mimeo. Luttmer, E. (2005). Neighbors as negatives: relative earnings and well-being. Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 2005). Schelling, T. (1978). Micromotives and macrobehavior. Norton. Sethi, R. and Somanathan, R. (2004). Inequality and Segregation. Discussion Paper 04-03. Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Planning Unit. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/16936 |