Ikonnikova, Svetlana (2007): Games in the Eurasian gas supply network: Multinational bargaining, Strategic investment, and Hold-up.
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Abstract
The paper analyzes multilateral relations and distortions of investments in the Eurasian gas network, supplying gas from countries of the Former Soviet Union to Western Europe. We use a two stage model of endogenous coalition formation to study cooperation among gas producers and transiters, some lacking the ability to make long-term commitments. In the first stage, the players cooperate to invest in pipelines and contract the sharing of rents. In the second stage, players form supply chains and bargain over supply profit sharing. Since competing supply chains can be formed, cooperation involves externalities. Our quantitative analysis predicts overinvestment as well as underinvestment in the network as an attempt to create countervailing power. Among other things we explain why Russia invests in the expensive pipeline through the Baltic sea and why Caspian gas producers are eager to build expensive bypasses around Russia.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Games in the Eurasian gas supply network: Multinational bargaining, Strategic investment, and Hold-up |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | strategic investment, hold-up, coalitional bargaining, gas supply, externalities |
Subjects: | L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q1 - Agriculture > Q10 - General |
Item ID: | 17852 |
Depositing User: | Svetlana Ikonnikova |
Date Deposited: | 13 Oct 2009 16:33 |
Last Modified: | 04 Oct 2019 16:43 |
References: | Maskin, Eric (2003), Coalitional Bargaining with Externalities, Mimeo Rajan, Roby (1989), Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies, International Economic Review, Vol. 30, No. 4 Segal, Ilya (2003), Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 70 Issue 2 Stern, Jonathan P (1999), Soviet and Russian gas: The origins and evolution of Gazprom's export strategy, in: Mabro, Robert & Wybrew-Bond, Ian (ed.), Gas to Europe. The strategies of four major suppliers, Oxford University Press Stole, Lars & Zwiebel, Je® (1996a), Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 63, No. 3. (Jul., 1996), pp. 375-410 Yi, S.-S. and H. Shin (2000), Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 18, pp. 229-256 |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/17852 |