One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences

Mumcu, Ayse and Saglam, Ismail (2006): One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences.

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem that allows for the prospect of being single, and study the existence and properties of stable matchings. We obtain the relationship between the stable set, the core, and the Pareto set, and give a sufficiency result for the existence of the stable set and the core. We also present several findings on the issues of gender optimality, lattices, strategy-proofness, and rationalizability.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Bogazici University
• Language: English
• Keywords: One-to-one matching; externalities
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory

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