Ben Youssef, Slim and Dinar, Zeineb (2009): Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale.
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Abstract
We develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of R&D level, the regulator can induce the first best outcome, when the marginal cost of production is increasing. This is not the case when the marginal cost of production is constant.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale |
English Title: | Regulation of a duopoly and environmental R&D |
Language: | French |
Keywords: | Duopole; Taxe d'émission; Subvention de R&D; Optimum de premier ordre; Coût marginal croissant. |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Item ID: | 20596 |
Depositing User: | Slim Ben Youssef |
Date Deposited: | 10 Feb 2010 07:11 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2019 04:44 |
References: | Ben Youssef, S., 2009, ''Transboundary Pollution, R&D Spillovers and International Trade'', The Annals of Regional Science, 43, 235-250. D'Aspremont, C. et A. Jacquemin, 1988, ''Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers'', The American Economic Review, 78, 1133-1137. D'Aspremont, C. et A. Jacquemin, 1990, ''Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum'', The American Economic Review, 80, 641-642. Farzin, Y.H. et P.M. Kort, 2000, ''Pollution Abatement Investment when Environmental Regulation is Uncertain'', Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2, 183-212. Fischer, C. et R.G. Newell, 2008, ''Environmental and Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation'', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 55, 142-162. Jung, C., K. Krutilla et R. Boyd, 1996, ''Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: an Evaluation of Policy Alternatives'', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30, 95-111. Milliman, S.R. et R. Prince, 1989, ''Firm Incentives to Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control'', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 17, 247-265. Stranlund, J.K., 1997, ''Public Technological Aid to Support Compliance to Environmental Standards'', Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 34, 228-239. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/20596 |
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