On continuous ordinal potential games

Kukushkin, Nikolai S. (2010): On continuous ordinal potential games.

Abstract

If the preferences of the players in a strategic game satisfy certain continuity conditions, then the acyclicity of individual improvements implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, starting from any strategy profile, an arbitrary neighborhood of the set of Nash equilibria can be reached after a finite number of individual improvements.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: potential game; compact-continuous game; finite improvement property
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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