McQuade, Timothy and Salant, Stephen W. and Winfree, Jason (2009): Markets with untraceable goods of unknown quality: a market failure exacerbated by globalization.
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Abstract
In markets for many fruits, vegetables, and an increasing number of imported goods, consumers cannot discern the quality of a product prior to purchase and can never identify its producer. Producing high-quality, safe goods is costly for a firm and raises the collective reputation for quality shared with its rivals. Minimum quality standards improve welfare. If consumers observe the country of origin of a product, quality, profits, and welfare increase. Exports from countries with more exporting firms are of lower quality and sell for lower prices. If one country imposes a minimum quality standard on its exports while other countries do not, consumers benefit. As for sellers, the regulation raises the profits of firms in the country with regulation and lowers the profits of firms in countries without regulation.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Markets with untraceable goods of unknown quality: a market failure exacerbated by globalization |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | globalization; quality; collective reputation; minimum quality standards |
Subjects: | L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility |
Item ID: | 21874 |
Depositing User: | Stephen W. Salant |
Date Deposited: | 07 Apr 2010 08:50 |
Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2019 04:38 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/21874 |